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Executive Summary 
 This March of 2016 marks the fifth-year anniversary of the Arab Spring uprisings in Syria, 
and therefore yet another year of brutal conflict and shattering displacement with no end in sight. 
As of November 2015, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
identified 4,290,332 registered refugees1 that have fled from Syria, and estimates another 7.6 
million internally displaced persons (IDPs)2 (2015; Al Rifai 2015). According to the UNHCR, just 
within Syria, more than 250,000 individuals have perished and over one million have been injured 
(UNHCR 2015). Those who have been lost trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe, as 
well as on other treacherous routes to different locations, are impossible to gather complete data 
on in such devastation (OCHA 2015). In response to atrocities throughout conflict in Syria, and to 
the severe annihilation and uprooting of human life, the global community has provided different 
forms of support via international aid. Aid to Syria can be broken down into three categories: 
military/governmental aid, emergency humanitarian assistance, and long-term development aid.   
 This report analyzes the complex relationships between conflict, displacement, aid, and 
economics. Providing a brief overview of the context of civil war in Syria and an analysis of 
development literature on micro- and macroeconomic consequences of conflict and displacement, 
it critically analyzes the role of emergency humanitarian aid in contribution to the persisting 
conflict in Syria. It then discusses relationships of humanitarian aid and conflict through past cases 
of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Rwanda. These two case studies have been chosen in order 
to demonstrate how aid can inadvertently become contributive to funding war economies, and also 
how the humanitarian principle of neutrality may render aid implementation and civilian safety 
vulnerable to manipulation. Finally, this report offers implications to consider for the current 
conflict economy in Syria, suggesting that it is imperative for humanitarian donors and 
practitioners to more responsibly allocate aid and resources. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Legal definitions of forcibly displaced persons distinguish the different services available to them based 
on their circumstances. According to the UNHCR, “a refugee is someone who, owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country” (UNHCR 2015). 
2 An IDP shares the same conditions as a refugee but is displaced within the borders of their country of 
nationality. They do not share the same legal status as a refugee (UNHCR 2015).  
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Civil War Context in Syria 
 
Syria is partly located on the Mediterranean Sea and shares its land borders with Turkey, 
Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon (CIA 2015). The city of Damascus is its capital. Syria was under 
rule by the Ottoman Empire, also known as the Turkish Empire, from the early 1500s until the fall 
of the Ottomans during World War I. It then became a French-mandated territory in 1920 (CIA 
2015). Under French rule, Syria was divided into three autonomous areas, segregating or newly 
mixing different ethnicities and religions depending on the region. Eventually, Germany’s defeat 
over France in World War II led to Syrian independence in 1946 (UNSC 2014). After centuries of 
outside control, military coups and political power struggles now continually threatened the 
country’s stability. This prompted Syria to partner with Egypt in 1958, becoming the United Arab 
Republic, which only lasted until 1961, when the two entities separated and Syria became the 
Syrian Arab Republic (2014). A final military coup in 1970 brought Hafez al-Assad to power under 
the socialist Ba’ath Party for 30 years. Both Assad and his successor, his son, are of the Alawite 
ethnic sect, a branch of the Shia Islamic sect; wielding dominant political power of a roughly 12% 
minority sect for 45 years now.  
 In terms of foreign policy, Assad aligned his administration with the Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War, and afterwards against the US and Israel with regard to Palestine. 
However, he repeatedly put the interests of maintaining his own regime before those of the 
Palestinians that he promised to protect (UNSC 2014). This betrayal included an abrupt truce with 
Israel in 1982 during conflict in Lebanon due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The truce left the 
city of Beirut unprotected by Syria, and Israel thus laid siege to Beirut. Israeli forces killed 18,000 
Lebanese and Palestinians, injuring an estimated 30,000 people (2014). Assad Senior is also 
known for internal repression throughout his 30 year-reign. Due to political and economic 
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instability, he enforced a State of Emergency Law in 1963, which “gave the government nearly 
unlimited authority to restrict individual freedoms and to investigate and detain suspects when 
national security and public safety were deemed to be at risk. Another law allowed for suspects to 
be tried and sentenced in special state security courts outside of the criminal justice system” 
(Brittanica Editors 2011). This law remained in effect for almost 50 years. 
Starting in the late-1970s, a group called the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni groups 
began to openly oppose Assad’s regime. In response to Muslim Brotherhood uprisings and attacks, 
Assad directly ordered military forces to siege the town of Hama in February of 1982. During a 
period of 27 days, Assad’s military ruthlessly slaughtered an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 civilians, 
exposing Assad’s willingness to rule his own people with an iron fist (UNSC 2014). After a heart 
attack led to his death in 2000, his legacy remains sharply disputed throughout the world. While 
he is often demonized for his brutality and a damaged economy, he is also glorified for his response 
to rebel forces in a politically fragmented region (Marsden and Shaoul 2000). Assad’s son, Bashar 
al-Assad, was “approved as president by popular referendum,” shortly after the elder al-Assad’s 
death (UNSC 2014). From now on, this report uses the name Assad to refer to Bashar, the current 
president of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
Although both Assad and his father are/were technically presidents of Syria, they are often 
regarded as harsh dictators. For Assad Junior, however, this was not always the case. He has been 
confirmed by the Syrian electorate twice, in 2000 and again in 2007, with no opposing candidate, 
and originally spoke of social reform (IAS 2015). He even released political prisoners of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in his early presidency. Assad has been outspoken against the US, Turkey 
and others, and is allied with Russia and Iran. However, since anti-government uprisings spurred 
throughout North Africa and the Middle East at the onset of the 2011 Arab Spring, Assad’s regime 
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has since committed atrocities against its citizens (2015).   
The Syrian Arab Spring began in a southern town of Daraa with anti-governmental graffiti 
painted by students. Assad responded by ordering the 13-year-old boys to be arrested. They were 
tortured by police officials and later released, spurring protests all over the country. Since then, 
“in the past four years, (the conflict) has disintegrated into a cauldron of competing rebel groups, 
terrorist elements, international powers, and religious factions--all with a quarter million Syrians 
killed with millions displaced” (IAS 2015). At the beginning of protests, Assad appeased requests 
to relinquish the decades-old State of Emergency Law. However, days later, “he set off the first of 
what became a series of withering crackdowns, sending tanks into restive cities as security forces 
opened fire on demonstrators” (2015). Provoking protestors to respond with force justified the 
escalation of governmental violence exercised. Syria’s deep ethnic and religious divisions have 
severely complicated the actors at play in the Civil War. This report does not serve to analyze the 
main interconnections and backgrounds of different groups involved in Syria’s conflict, but 
illustrated below is the nature of relationships between its main allies, enemies and internal groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Burns 6 
 
 Given Syria’s history of politically imposed ethnic segregation and mixing, it is also 
necessary to understand its population differences that are tied to conflict. As of December 2014, 
Syria’s estimated population of 22.16 million is divided into more than 20 ethnic groups (World 
Bank 2016). These ethnicities are group identities that are historically constructed and based off 
of various or a combination of factors, including language, religion, shared history, culture, etc. 
(Columbia University 2016). Dominant religious practices in Syria include the majority practice 
of Islam, followed by Christianity and Gnosticism (related to Christianity). The following map 
from the G/2000 Project for statistics by Columbia University illustrates Syria’s main ethnic 
makeup distribution between 1997 and 2016. The white areas show lower population density. 
While the next section explores relationships of conflict, displacement, economics and aid, the 
populations involved in and vulnerable to armed conflict in Syria are necessary to keep in mind. 
Ethnic Composition of Syria (adjusted from original image) 
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Conflict, Displacement and Aid 
 
Economic Consequences of Conflict 
 
 The UNHCR has identified 12.2 million individuals in need of humanitarian assistance in 
Syria, including 4.3 million refugees and 7.6 million IDPs (UNHCR 2015, 1). This section draws 
on history and development literature to discuss the economic consequences and benefits of 
conflict and displacement, in order to situate Syria within these variables. In terms of armed 
conflicts, the end of the Cold War brought major political changes, an aftermath of poor 
governance in formerly colonized states, and a surge in civil wars across the globe (Uvin 1999). 
Armed conflict causes imperative repercussions both for human victims, and their surrounding 
structures and institutions. Victims of conflict are likely to suffer from “malnutrition, illness, 
wounds, torture, and harassment of specific groups within the population; disappearances, extra-
judicial executions,” sexualized violence and mass forced displacement (Perrin 1998). Aside from 
not only stripping individuals of their basic needs and well-being, armed conflict also erodes their 
surrounding physical, economic and social structures. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
found in 2002 that “Over 4 million people are estimated to have died in violent conflicts between 
1989 and 2000, and 37 million people displaced both internally and externally. In the year 2000, 
25 major armed conflicts occurred, 23 were cross-border” (Gupta et al. 2002, 3). Regardless of 
measures to resolve and prevent conflict, it has since overwhelmingly increased, as demonstrated 
by the current conflict in Syria (UCDP 2015). 
Economist Daniel Mejía defines conflict in terms of “the defense of one’s resources or 
wealth from the threat of exportation or destruction by others” (2004, 3). Resources can also be 
understood in terms of human rights, which allow one to access the necessary tools to live a decent 
life. Amidst human rights atrocities in Syria, one can infer that armed conflict not only physically, 
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but also emotionally strips victims of their resources through which they approach daily life. 
Conflict effects everything through its severe social, political and economic consequences. It 
occurs for a variety of reasons and may be internal (civil war or rebellion within a state), external 
(between states) or in the form of terrorism (initiated by non-state actors) (Skaperdas 2009, 2). In 
the case of Syria, we see both internal conflict and terrorism, as well as indirect conflict between 
states. Some instigators of conflict include poor governance, different forms of inequality or 
poverty, and struggles for resources. Currently, most conflicts occur in the ‘developing’ world, but 
also create devastation and complication for the entire global community (Gupta et al. 2002, 2). 
In “The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence,” economist Stergios 
Skaperdas differentiates between the direct and indirect costs of conflict. Based on available data 
in 2009, he evaluates direct costs to include: “destroyed public infrastructure, destroyed factories 
and machinery, destroyed housing, autos, and other personal property, budgetary appropriations 
for cost of war and cost of lost equipment, death toll, physical and mental injuries, future costs of 
disability, and future costs of physical and mental health care” (Skaperdas 2009, 5). Skaperdas 
then lists indirect costs of conflict as “population displacement, reduced production due to violence 
or its threat, reduced trade due to violence or its threat, lower current and future physical 
investment, reduction in education opportunities, brain drain, reduced tourism from abroad, other 
macroeconomic effects (inflation, further unemployment, reduced economic growth), and overall 
welfare costs” (2009, 6). These costs account for social impacts as economic reduction of human 
capital, productivity and overall net economic losses. As included in Skaperdas’ analysis, 
macroeconomic effects occur whether the conflict is internal or external (including national or 
international terrorism). In a globalized neoliberal system, the free market suffers drastic changes 
in commodity chains, especially since most conflict occurs in ‘developing’ nations which are 
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generally export-based economies. As a result, inflation can occur not only within a country of 
conflict, but for trade partners and consumers around the world. Additionally, conflicts that 
produce a large number of refugees, such as in Syria, put a strain on resources for refugee-receiving 
nations, cyclically augmenting social stress and the likeliness of conflict emergence (Cali et al. 
2015, 34). While Skaperdas adequately addresses the negative impacts on cash flows that were 
typical prior to conflict, he fails to recognize certain benefits that Mejía explores. 
Mejía rejects the notion that all economic outcomes of conflict are negative in “Conflict 
and Economic Growth: A Survey of Theoretical Links” (2004). Analyzing the relationship 
between conflict and growth, Mejía weighs the options for societies to allocate resources towards 
further measures of defense, or to the discontinuation or resolution of conflict. He discusses 
instances of conflict’s positive influences on economic growth, including a redirection of human 
capital to defense practices, which can lead to increased morale and efficiency for post-conflict 
strategies. Upon the end of conflict, countries can experience massive benefits to economic 
growth, as the majority of the labor force returns to productive activities in goods and services, 
and rapidly accumulates capital. This type of capital refers to wealth in the form of money or 
assets, and is different than human capital, which indicates the economic value of an individual or 
population based on their skills, knowledge and experience (World Bank 2016). Mejía uses the 
examples of Germany and Japan in World War II to demonstrate that although conflict can be 
detrimental to short-term growth, it can have significant positive influences on long-term growth 
(2004, 9). While this is true in the contexts of his examples, Mejía does not account for the different 
historical conjectures that play a part in a nation’s capability to bounce back both economically 
and socially. For example, Germany and Japan do not suffer from the same legacies of 
colonialization that most ‘developing’ countries, like Syria (in relation to the Ottoman Empire and 
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France) continue to endure, and so their trajectory for post-conflict growth is arguably on a 
different scale of comparison. Nonetheless, he found that ‘developing’ countries tend to invest 
more resources and labor into defense and less into productive activities so much so that they may 
become caught in a ‘growth trap’, when “countries cannot expand their wealth because they 
continue to invest in defense rather than production, yet their inability to accumulate wealth leaves 
them more susceptible to conflict” (2004, 6). This applies the concept of the ‘poverty trap’ to a 
national level, and demonstrates how growth also influences conflict. As growth increases, so must 
protection of property rights, but if not, then circumstances prone to conflict are more likely to 
arise. Mejía therefore asserts that countries must undertake significant institutional reforms after 
adopting Western capitalism as a prerequisite of conflict prevention (2004, 17). However, while 
capitalism tends to exacerbate inequalities, one must not only take into account a context’s 
capability for linear growth and protection of property rights, but also existing conceptions of 
property and growth that may differ. Although capitalism is utilized to the advantage of conflict 
prevention in certain contexts, it may very well present a threat to the volatility of conflict in others. 
In “Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low and Middle Income 
Countries” for the IMF in 2002, researchers Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, Rina 
Bhattacharya, and Shamit Chakravarti analyzed twenty-two cases of armed conflict and terrorism 
in low and middle income countries. Extending from Mejía’s point on security expenditure, they 
state that “Higher spending for security can also affect the composition of public spending by 
decreasing outlays for education, health, and other productive items. Moreover, the destruction of 
physical infrastructure and human capital due to violence and the indirect effects on trade, tourism, 
and business confidence, all weaken the fiscal position and adversely affect economic growth” 
(2002, 5). The authors then reinforce previous arguments that conflict both negatively and 
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positively influences economic stability by discussing subsequent resource mobilization and 
flourishing informal economies during wartime. Applying this analysis to conflict in Syria, it can 
be assumed that the deeply polarized nation will face severe economic instability for quite some 
time to come. As of now, its gross domestic product (GDP) annual growth rate stands at -2.3% 
(World Bank 2016). While eventual post-conflict periods may also lead to further instability as 
power dynamics will likely shift and whoever is in charge will have a broken economy and social 
fabric to mend, there is hope for a reallocation of human capital and productivity for the future of 
the economy. Something irreparable, however, may be the millions of Syrians currently displaced 
outside of their country of nationality. For example, the 1.1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
are not even included in the existing population statistics of about 4.5 million Lebanese, meaning 
Syrian refugees alone comprise an additional 25% beyond the existing population, not including 
Pakistani or Iraqi refugees (USAID 2015). This presents circumstances of reduced capital for post-
conflict in Syria, as well as stress on the resources of refugee-receiving countries, such as Lebanon.  
 
Economic Consequences of Displacement 
In “The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Lebanese Trade” (2015), World Bank Group 
researchers Massimiliano Cali, Wissam Harake, Fadi Hassan, and Clemens Struck reveal the 
extreme economic pressure that Lebanon has undertaken by accepting the highest number of 
Syrian refugees in the world. Through several econometric analyses, the authors determined that 
the effects of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon, who has almost doubled its population with incoming 
refugees, was surprisingly mixed. Contrary to Turkish and Jordanian exporters, Lebanese exports 
to Syria have actually increased in some sectors, namely food, beverages and tobacco. This can 
partly be attributed to the trade and smuggling relationships discussed earlier. The main mode of 
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transport has also shifted from the now dangerous land routes, to the sea through the port of Beirut, 
saving on land costs that have inflated since the conflict (Calie et al. 2015, 46). While “The war 
has reduced the Syrian demand for goods and services, including of Lebanese origin…on average 
an exporter of foods to Syria before the war lost US $90,000 by 2012,” Lebanon has also been able 
to account for some of the lost production (46). Lebanon also does not rely as heavily on tourism 
as other nations in the region, so the erosion of that sector has been bearable (47). However, 
Lebanon’s domestic security conditions are deteriorating with surrounding conflict and recent 
terrorist attacks on Beirut. The authors argue that external support to help with formal integration 
of Syrians into the Lebanese economy would be effective in maximizing the benefit of their 
presence (48). Their study offers an interesting foundation to further explore the current economic 
well-being of Lebanese households because, as a small area receiving millions of refugees, the 
nation is positioned as perceivably helpless and disadvantaged; but their findings of unexpected 
positive outcomes indicate the current entrepreneurial creativity of individuals and households 
dealing with changing circumstances. The following study on Uganda explores the different 
factors that influence households in the context of mass displacement. 
Agricultural economist Nathan Fiala looks into the well-being of IDP households in 
Uganda in “Economic Consequences of Forced Displacement” (2015). Fiala compares household 
consumption patterns before, during and after displacement for IDPs from a wide range of 
socioeconomic classes, as well as the effects of living in an IDP camp for an extended period of 
time. He describes that the initial effects of displacement were drastic. Ugandan IDPs lost assets, 
including agriculture and livestock, and the ability to earn income or further their education; 
stripping away their ability to use or develop any productive skills. Fiala states that this essentially 
“removes them from the mainstream economic system” (2015, 17). In camps, Ugandan IDPs 
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depended on humanitarian aid from NGOs for means of survival, most now living in much lower 
living standards than pre-displacement times. While most households saw a decrease in 
consumption, poorer households actually increased their consumption patterns in camps, 
unintentionally creating a dependency upon aid for households that lacked the capital to recover 
from displacement (2015, 18-19). Upon resettlement post-conflict, displaced households showed 
a 28-35 percent lower rate of consumption than household that were not displaced, as even 
wealthier families struggled to recover (2015, 17). However long this temporary set-back was for 
many families that eventually were able to normalize their losses, displacement became a 
permanent setback for others who entered a poverty trap. Fiala’s anaylsis demonstrates how 
displacement exacerbates class dynamics throughout and after conflict. He also discusses asset 
recovery programs provided by NGOs that were insufficient compared to the assistance previously 
provided in camps. He concludes that this dependency has contributed to poor families still not 
being able to obtain the capital necessary to recover from displacement (2015, 20). The case of 
Uganda offers considerations to take into account for Syria, including the inequality that 
displacement exacerbates, as well as dependency on aid when conflict, displacement and human 
rights abuses strip victims of various physical and internal resources. The following section 
continues the conversation of economic consequences of conflict and displacement by 
incorporating intertwined relationships of humanitarian aid in the specific context of Syria. 
 
Aid Dynamics in Syria 
As stated previously, the UNHCR has identified 12.2 million individuals in need of 
humanitarian assistance in Syria (UNHCR 2015, 1). Since the start of this conflict, aid has been 
contributed by means of humanitarian, military and development funding types. Humanitarian aid 
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consists of two kinds: emergency assistance, which this report focuses on, and a transition to long-
term development aid which humanitarian organizations also have a role in. Emergency assistance 
can be provided in many forms, including food, shelter, health or educational services, protection, 
etc., and even through cash and vouchers that allow beneficiaries to access resources in camps 
according to their particular needs. However, the necessity of these services increases as conflict 
worsens, and in 2015 the UNHCR estimated a total of $8.4 billion required to reach the 12.2 
million in need - $2.9 billion for their 2015 Syria Response Plan (SRP) and $5.5 billion for their 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) (2015, 1). The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) 
reports that 57% of these needs were met in 2015, demonstrating that there remains a huge gap in 
services provided versus actual needs. The FTS determined that $7,213,389,150 worth of 
requirements was necessary to respond to Syria’s conflict and displacement. A total of 
$5,857,170,953 was donated to Syria in 2015, by “donor commitments and contributions towards 
the SRP and 3RP, as well as contributions outside these frameworks… as reported to FTS and 
UNHCR,” but only $4,079,683,937 was received by beneficiaries, presenting a $3,133,705,213 
deficit and a staggering $1,841,314,129 that was actually donated but not received (FTS 2015). 
FTS’ calculation of aid funded versus aid received exposes an alarming gap in resources that the 
following analysis explores. This section will discuss aid providers in Syria, obstacles to 
distribution, as well as evidence that aid is aiding conflict and the broader implications of patterns 
that have emerged. 
Within Syria, since 2012, international aid has been mainly deployed from Damascus by 
UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and about a dozen 
international NGOs (in the Appendix, see Figure 1 which disaggregates 2014 aid indicators and 
outcomes, and Figure 2, which maps distribution). Their aid is then channeled through local 
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organizations, mainly the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (MSF 2013). Some of the core humanitarian 
organizations involved in providing assistance to Syria include: Doctors without Borders 
(Médecins Sans Frontières or MSF), Oxfam America, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, 
Save the Children, as well as others (FTS 2015). However, several factors have created obstacles 
for these organizations to effectively reach and address the needs of civilians. Overall, these 
organizations function within an arguably shrinking humanitarian space. While the definition of 
this “space” is widely debated conceptually, common understandings include the physical access 
that agencies have to vulnerable populations, and vice versa; agency ability to uphold core 
humanitarian principles, such as neutrality; and widespread budget cuts that narrow the amount of 
aid available for each humanitarian crisis at a time. Cynthia Brassard-Boudreau and Don Hubert 
provide evidence that this space is shrinking due to “decreasing respect for humanitarian law, 
increases in attacks on humanitarian workers and declining access to populations at risk… the 
blurring of boundaries between humanitarian organizations and other actors and agendas, 
including militaries and the delivery of assistance, counter-insurgency strategies and integrated 
UN missions” (2010). The role of foreign and non-state actors in the conflict in Syria contributes 
to shrinking the humanitarian space because various types of aid to Syria are distributed based on 
the political agendas of the aiding entity. It is important to take into account that the complex and 
diverse group of actors have conflicting objectives. For example, relational chart in the previous 
section illustrates Iranian monetary and military support to the Assad government. Russia and 
China are not included in the chart but also provide this same type of foreign aid as political allies 
of Assad. While Assad forces bomb rebel areas and therefore also target civilians in these areas, 
the foreign aid counteracts that of MSF or the UN who are working in response to attacks on 
civilians and their displacement. Such contradictory aid distribution sources make Syria a proxy 
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ground for the establishment and negotiation of global and regional political agendas and loyalties.  
 Another major obstacle for distribution of aid to Syrian civilians is governmental 
regulations on aid, as well as crumbling infrastructure. Humanitarian organizations must be 
authorized by the Syrian government to distribute emergency aid on the ground, but, as reported 
in “Syria Two Years On: The Failure of International Aid” (2013) by MSF; the government has 
not allowed local NGOs to work in government-held territory for years now (see territory map, 
Figure 3 in the Appendix). Outside of these territories, the government still limits humanitarian 
aid and may refuse entry into Damascus. Thus, the local groups through which humanitarian 
organizations are required to distribute aid are limited geographically and also already operate at 
full capacity (MSF 2013). Beyond the narrow reach of humanitarian actors in Syria, “most aid for 
civilians comes from three sources: the Syrian diaspora, countries ‘sympathizing’ with the 
opposition (Saudi Arabia, France, Turkey, Qatar, and others), and political and religious solidarity 
networks” (MSF 2013). Any of this aid is vulnerable to targeted bombings by any party. For 
example, Russian airstrikes in December of 2015 in Northern Syria paralyzed various aid routes, 
which have been repeatedly dysfunctional both within Syria and across its borders due to 
crumbling infrastructure from attacks (Sly 2015). The fragile and strictly regulated aid network 
thus creates a situation in which access to services is simply not consistently available by formal 
or legal means, not only within Syria, but for the now 1.9 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, 1.1 
million in Lebanon, 628,887 in Jordan, 248,503 in Iraq, and millions of others across Europe 
(USAID 2015).  
 The lack of infrastructure and resources in Syria has inevitably led to smuggling and 
skyrocketing black market activity since the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the scope of informal 
economics in Syria is not new and certainly does not always involve necessarily illegal activities. 
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In “Shadows and Sovereigns,” Carolyn Nordstrom draws on her fifteen years of field experience 
working in war zones to describe shadow economies as existent both outside of and alongside 
formal economic activity, and as just as centrally entrenched in economic, political and 
sociocultural forces (2000, 37). Applying this to Syria, Matt Herbert describes the existing shadow, 
or informal but accepted, economy in Syria prior to 2011, and explains how the start of conflict 
actually has strengthened both new and old smuggler relationships across surrounding national 
borders (Herbert 2014, 56). While many partnerships were established beforehand, the desperate 
need for resources in and for escape out has led to elaborate and creative trade routes, as well as 
the illicit marketization of human smuggling from Syria to safety (2014, 70). “In turn, the networks 
benefitted greatly from the chaos, both by supplying the demand for weapons and humanitarian 
aid, and by leveraging the chaos of war to systematically appropriate and loot key sectors of the 
economy. The increase in smuggling was enabled by a sharp decline in Syrian government power 
in the borderlands, a trend accelerated by the military success of rebel groups in those areas” (2014, 
76). Given the strict restrictions on aid fluidity in Syria, it is also a logical assumption that aid 
workers would utilize these channels, and that not all aid is moved formally. In 2012, two Syrian 
men who had fled to Turkey with their families reported being part of a network of at least 60 
Syrian aid smugglers that commissioned humanitarian aid from Turkey, and traveled back and 
forth between its porous borders with Syria in order to distribute it to civilians with little to no 
access to resources (Agence France-Presse 2012). This example provides evidence of 
humanitarian aid’s role in Syria’s current shadow economies. This can become problematic, 
however, when aid becomes directly integrated into the war economy.  
 While aid is moved informally to reach civilians, a portion is also used as bargaining 
leverage with enemy forces like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). “Not only are 
Burns 18 
 
foodstuffs, medical supplies—even clinics—going to ISIS, the distribution networks are paying 
ISIS ‘taxes’ and putting ISIS people on their payrolls” (Dittmer 2014). Aid workers in Syria 
explain that truckloads of food and medical equipment, funded by the UN, the EU and the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), are moved into ISIS territories in order to reach 
civilians there; which comes with a price. Reportedly, not only do pay-offs to enter ISIS territory 
contribute to their income, but bribes are disguised as transport costs and “’there is always at least 
one ISIS person on the payroll’” that communicates directly between the aid workers and an ISIS 
emir, or leader (2014). This forced but consistent relationship has also further hindered the 
movement of aid from other more neglected regions in northeast Syria. Furthermore, aid is by 
principle neutral, which means it does not discriminate against ISIS members in need of care. 
“Many aid workers are uncomfortable with what’s happening. ‘A few months ago we delivered a 
mobile clinic for a USAID-funded NGO,’ says one, who declined to be named. ‘A few of us 
debated the rights and wrongs of this. The clinic was earmarked for the treatment of civilians, but 
we all know that wounded ISIS fighters could easily be treated as well. So what we are doing here 
is helping their fighters, who we are bombing, to be treated so they can fight again?’” (2014). 
While aid workers and donors don’t want to revoke assistance that could reach innocent civilians, 
this presents an ethical dilemma concerning humanitarian neutrality, which this report will soon 
address in detail. Outside of humanitarian assistance, the privatization of aid accelerates inequality 
in terms of what sectors of the Syrian population have access to resources. 
 Private donors from abroad have also become a ‘wild card’ in this war. Sympathizers of 
any party are now able to donate cash directly towards their preferred beneficiary. “One Kuwait-
based effort raised money to equip 12,000 rebel fighters for $2,500 each. Another campaign, run 
by a Saudi sheikh based in Syria and close to Al Qaeda, is called ‘Wage Jihad with Your Money.’ 
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Donors earn ‘silver status’ by giving $175 for 50 sniper bullets, or ‘gold status’ by giving twice as 
much for eight mortar rounds,” rationalizing from their standpoint, “’we want to get Bashar out of 
Syria, so why not cooperate with Al Qaeda?’” (Hubbard 2013). These donors create a self-
sustaining dynamic that is “totally independent of all the strategic and diplomatic games that are 
happening and being led by states” (2013). Not only does privatized aid directly fuel armed conflict 
in Syria, it creates an elitist privilege to resources that are inaccessible to the average civilian. 
Private, selective aid distribution makes it so members of the Syrian population do not have the 
same capacity to earn or access cash, which influences dynamics of who controls local goods in 
the functional and dominant shadow economy, as well as its inflation rates (Nordstrom 2000, 51).  
Such control of non-state actors then exacerbates inequalities such as class, gender and age by 
further immobilizing civilian populations while funding combatants. Whether this cycle presents 
an incentive for more civilians to join armed groups is at least a possibility. Regardless, privatized 
aid presents an example of how the humanitarian space is shrinking and that aid, not only (but 
including) humanitarian, is aiding conflict in Syria. 
 The patters of aid distribution that this section has discussed inform the nuanced decisions 
of donors and allies. The international community has so far tended to tread with caution when 
sending aid to Syria due to the complexity of actors involved, among other factors, and the 
unknown amount of aid that contributes to ongoing conflict is a major reason to at least hesitate or 
withhold funds, risking the provision of help for civilians. While millions of Syrians are so clearly 
in desperate need of assistance, this raises the question of why international powers have not 
interfered based on their Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In 2005 at the UN World Summit, all 
UN member states adopted the global commitment of R2P, meaning that they agreed to actively 
prevent realities of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. The 
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topic of R2P has been central to international discourse on how to respond to atrocities committed 
in Syria, but little has been done to intervene and thwart future violence (Adams 2015, 3). 
Increasing pressure is being put on the Security Council and foreign powers, like the United States, 
to engage their R2P, but requests have been answered by assistance provision rather than 
intervention. Political-economic relations come in to play in these decisions, especially due to 
some of Syria’s powerful allies. Thus, conflict in Syria has not only presents local and regional 
implications, but also global. Locally, the dynamics of informal aid channels and bargaining also 
directly impact regional economies in refugee-receiving countries like Lebanon and Jordan. 
Further analysis into aid movement and profiteering in Syrian IDP and refugee camps would likely 
also yield important insight into the aid dynamics at hand. This section has offered insight into the 
dynamics of conflict, displacement and aid in literature and in Syria, demonstrating that aid, 
including but not exclusively emergency humanitarian assistance, has become part of the Syrian 
war economy. The following section explores other examples where this has occurred, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Rwanda, further incorporating the principle of humanitarian neutrality into the 
analysis of the complexity of armed conflict in Syria.  
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Humanitarian Aid and Neutrality 
 
 
 This study has so far discussed humanitarian aid in the case of Syria. While emergency 
assistance is undoubtedly a necessary service throughout and after armed conflict, this section 
examines its shortcomings by drawing on relevant literature and past humanitarian crises. 
Humanitarian action is guided by four main principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
independence. In Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, the Director of 
Research at MSF, Fiona Terry, critically analyzes these principles based on her informed 
experience in the field and in academia. While Terry’s criticisms of humanitarian aid directly serve 
the purposes of this report, her arguments are limited to her individual experiences and are subject 
to unjust generalization. In Condemned to Repeat?, Terry sates that “humanitarian assistance is 
necessary only once governments or combatants have been unwilling or unable to shoulder their 
respective responsibilities” (2002, 17). In situations of conflict, humanitarian organizations must 
stay politically neutral in attempts to navigate between the regulations of sovereign states and 
actors, as to not risk their ability to effectively provide safety for and reduce the suffering of 
victims. Neutrality puts saving human life first, on all ‘sides’ of a conflict.  Regardless, 
“humanitarianism has political impacts that influence dynamics of peace and violence” (Uvin 
1999). Terry exposes the paradox that humanitarian aid actually becomes integral to conflict: 
 
Humanitarian assistance will always have some negative consequences even if 
these are not immediately visible to aid organizations. Aid will always generate 
some winners and some losers; in order to reach victims it is often necessary to 
work with and through rebel leaders or government officials who have blood 
all over their hands. Pretending that aid can actually be given without causing 
any harm is utopian. Moreover, it is counterproductive if we are to make hard-
headed assessments about the relative good and harm of our actions and act 
accordingly (Fiona Terry as cited in Sexton 2003). 
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 In Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, Janice Gross Stein discusses the 
accountability of humanitarianism, despite its political neutrality in policy. She argues that 
accountability has been stunted by the concept of neutrality since the field’s establishment (Barnett 
and Weiss 2008, 142). Nonetheless, humanitarian organizations balance and juggle the needs and 
obligations of those they serve, of those that fund and of their own ethics as well, creating an 
inevitable dynamic of power and politics. In other words, the foundational principles and intentions 
of humanitarianism do not make those that function within its policy immune to accountability for 
its short- and long-term, in this case; economic consequences. Despite a decrease in armed 
conflicts between the 1990s and 2008, aid towards conflict continued to increase, as illustrated 
below, and there has since been a rise in conflict globally (Gha 2010). 
 
Growth in Humanitarian Funding to Conflict-Affected States, 1999-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
DAC: Development  
          Assistance Committee 
 
 
 
 
The following case study on Bosnia-Herzegovina examines how humanitarian aid has 
played a role in exacerbating the previously discussed economic consequences of armed 
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conflicts, focusing on war economies. It is one of the two following examples that serve as 
opportunities to extract lessons and learn from former crises for the current practice of 
humanitarianism in Syria. 
 
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-1995 
The Bosnian War entailed a series of large and small sieges over the course of three years, 
resulting in civilian deaths estimated to be in the tens or hundreds of thousands (Andreas 2008, 
165). Humanitarian workers played many formal and informal roles throughout the conflict. 
“Formally, the United Nations (UN)-directed humanitarian aid operation fed Sarajevo’s (capital 
city) civilian population… Informally, the relief effort fed the opposing armies and enriched black 
marketeers on all sides” (2008, 43). Some black market activity included prostitution, trade in 
cigarettes, heroin, alcohol and food, as well as other mafia activity, leading to increased capital for 
weaponry and so on. Initially, the UN handed over almost a quarter of all aid to Serb besiegers in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to gain access to civilians in Sarajevo. The money from that 
agreement directly trickled into and funded ongoing smuggling channels. In addition to the aid 
directly handed over, with Serb forces surrounding the city, 30 percent of all aid was typically 
“lost” in route to aid workers and civilians within, while “the UNHCR and other aid agencies 
pragmatically tolerated and accepted a certain amount of theft and diversion as the price of 
admission” (2008, 43). Given the sociopolitical fragility within Sarajevo, humanitarian decisions 
to ‘look the other way’ allowed organizations to continue reaching vulnerable populations, while 
simultaneously fueling sources of conflict and exploitation that sustained such vulnerability. A 
layout of how humanitarian aid contributes to the economy of war, as it did in Bosnia, is provided 
on the following page. 
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The contribution of humanitarian aid to the economy of war 
     Economic Levels   
Type of  Macro   Meso  Micro 
Contribution        
    
Legal - Import taxes - Housing rental - Assistance to local 
 - Immigration fees - Car rental authorities 
 - Warehouse rental - Truck rental - Purchase of local raw 
 - Purchase of food - Purchase of locally materials 
 - Taxation of salaries   manufactured - Taxation of salaries 
 - Airport/port charges   products  
 - Administration fees - Taxation of salaries  
 - Exchange rates      
    
 
 
  Gray Area  
 
- Obligatory employment  
  of certain staff  
- Obligatory employment    
  of certain staff 
- Employment of guards   
- Taxation of recipients 
     - Taxation of recipients  
     
Illegal - Government misuse of - Checkpoint extortion - Checkpoint extortion 
  aid - Looting materials from - Looting recipients after 
 - Bribery and corruption   aid agencies distribution 
 - Black market purchase - Protection rackets - Trading in looted goods 
  and currency exchange - Inflated population  
     numbers  
        
        (Terry 2002, 35) 
 
 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN had also identified and funded six “safe areas” within six 
different cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily to protect Muslim civilians from Serb attacks 
(Terry 2002, 30). Due to obligations of neutrality, these areas were negotiated to be demilitarized, 
without the necessary humanitarian capacity to actually do so, or to defend the areas. The “safe” 
areas allegedly ended up being used by the Bosnian government to refuel and launch attacks from 
within. Ultimately, Bosnian Serbs viewed the safe areas as strategic zones for Bosnian Muslims 
and overran two of the safe areas in 1995, killing up to 20,000 civilians (2002, 31). Thus, the 
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economic investment of these zones created in Bosnia-Herzegovina under humanitarian objectives 
became tools for an escalation of conflict, as well as targeted areas for massacre. This suggests 
that ‘neutral’ spaces within conflict zones are simply unrealistic. In addition, the spoken and 
unspoken negotiations made by aid workers throughout conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
inadvertently sustained conflict by bolstering the informal sector and therefore indirectly funding 
opposing militarized benefactors until blood was shed within the parameters of aid protection 
itself. The war economy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including aid-workers bargaining with and 
bribing locals to access vulnerable populations, is relevant to the previous discussion of aid routes 
and shadow economies in Syria. While the conflict persists, the “safe zones” in this case study also 
serve as a cautionary lesson for spaces created by aid organizations in Syria. The next study on 
Rwanda further explores such spaces and analyzes how aid has been mishandled and used to 
further segregate conflicting groups, again presenting the principle of neutrality as an obstacle to 
responsible aid allocation and management. 
 
Rwandan Refugee and IDP Camps in Zaire, post-1994 
Before Bosnia-Herzegovina was at war, Rwanda had been in a civil war since 1990 
between the Hutu-led government of President Juvénal Habyarimana and the rebel Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), largely comprised of Tutsi IDPs. This gruesome war led to a 100-day 
genocidal mass slaughter of Tutsi and moderate Hutu ethnic groups in Rwanda by members of the 
Hutu majority in 1994. An estimated 500,000 – 1,000,000 Rwandans were killed, with no outside 
intervention to help stop the blood (Terry 202, 180). While the presence of humanitarian aid did 
play a role in the war economy during Rwanda’s Civil War and genocide, this analysis will instead 
focus on their aftermath, in which war criminals became exempt from prosecution while in refugee 
Burns 26 
 
camps in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), manifesting conflict within refugee and 
IDP camps; another type of “safe” zone. 
 The RPF claimed its victory in 1994 by shooting down the president’s plane. More than 
200,000 Hutu Rwandans then fled to refugee camps in the Hutu-led Zaire. Though it was 
impossible to really tell victim from perpetrator in the camps, the UN identified thousands of 
former leaders, military personnel and militia that had been involved in the genocide against Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu Rwandans (Adelman 1997). Here, Tutsi refugees from Rwanda and other 
nations were now forced to coexist with members of the extremist and ruthless Hutu combatants. 
Hutu authorities within the camps created sub-states and charged refugees for goods that they were 
entitled to for free by the UNHCR. “The former government authorities imposed their control on 
the refugee population through a well-conceived institutional, political and administrative 
framework” (1997). They also used tactics of psychological violence, threats and propaganda in 
order to prevent Tutsis from leaving the camps. Zairian police forces were deployed in order to 
create a barrier between genuine refugees and Hutu killers, termed ‘refugee warriors’. These forces 
regulated food and other material distribution, but ultimately became a back-up militant force for 
the Hutu refugee warriors (1997). Terry argues that despite the catastrophe of governance in these 
camps, humanitarian organizations decided to stay for four reasons: 1) they rationalized that Tutsi 
refugees would be more vulnerable upon their departure, 2) the principle of neutrality took 
precedence, 3) some believed they could enact change and control the militia, 4) others aimed to 
distribute aid as technically and efficiently as possible, without getting involved in any local 
political issues (Terry 2002, 200). “With a military force in place, with economic resources, with 
a host government that not only looked the other way, but facilitated their operations, a quasi-state 
had been established in the refugee camps in Zaire. The captive population that was not only being 
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fed by the international community but, based on exaggerated figures of the refugee population, 
was supplying the refugees with surpluses that could be sold on the black market.” (Adelman 
1997). 
 Several killings were carried out against Tutsi refugees in Zaire, while Hutu IDPs in south 
Rwanda were also imprisoned by their camp. In 1995, more than 4,000 ethnically Hutu Rwandans 
were murdered in the Kibeho Camp massacre by the new RPF government. Humanitarian actors 
remained silent in order to stay ‘neutral’: 
 
[There were] about 150,000 refugees standing shoulder to shoulder on a mountain 
plateau the size of three football fields... For the last sixty hours the refugees had 
been forced to relieve themselves where they stand or where they have fallen. The 
stench takes my breath away... The refugees do nothing, say nothing, just stare at 
the Zambians... The two roads winding through the mountains to Kibeho have been 
closed. Food and water convoys from aid organisations are being stopped and sent 
back. The government has forbidden all refugee aid...A group of refugees, about 
six of them, break away and start running into the valley. Rwandan troops started 
firing immediately. We see the refugee fall dead. I scream at Capt. Francis 
[Zambian officer] “Stop them! Do something!”... He answers “We have been 
ordered to cooperate with the Rwandan authorities, not shoot at them.” “Even if 
they kill innocent people before your eyes?” “Yes,” he answers (Polman 1999). 
 
 
Terry also describes the half-effort made by the international community after the Kibeho attack. 
Aid was pulled out for one month and then re-implemented after an ‘International Independent 
Commission of Inquiry’ into the massacre, authored by members of the RPF. All aid organizations 
eventually withdrew once Rwanda was no longer considered a “complex emergency situation” 
(2002, 211). The Rwandan crisis challenges honoring the principle of humanitarian neutrality 
above all else. Other examples of aid aiding war economies and displacement include: Afghan 
refugee camps in Pakistan, Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras, Cambodian 
refugee camps in Thailand, MSF and the economy of war in Somalia, action and legitimacy in 
Biafra, and famine and population control in Northern Ethiopia (Terry, 2002). While the case of 
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Rwanda also demonstrates the extreme costs of neutrality at times, as well as the risks associated 
with ‘safe spaces’, it more so reveals how conflicting dynamics between populations are able to 
manifest themselves within IDP and refugee camps. This is pertinent to Syria given its ethnic 
diversity and the social inequality that has been deepened by the devastation of conflict and 
displacement. Such dynamics of inequality are directly related to civilian access to resources, even 
in camps, and both the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda warn for the field of 
humanitarianism to be cautious when it comes to assuming that any space is safe during armed 
conflict, especially when neutrality is a prerequisite for this safety within a context of warring 
entities. The following section discusses these implications for Syria in more depth. 
 
 
Implications for Syria 
This report has provided a brief overview of conflict in Syria, as well as an analysis of 
economic consequences of conflict, displacement, and emergency humanitarian aid. Historical 
trends reveal the local, regional and global economic repercussions that Syria and its neighboring 
countries face, as well as potential long-term economic growth during post-conflict that would 
actually benefit the region. Nevertheless, while the conflict persists, previous armed conflicts 
provide lessons for Syria, including how emergency aid and shadow markets become contributive 
to war economies. A case study on the war economy in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the 
possibility of humanitarian aid and assistance functioning as tools that perpetuate conflict and 
exacerbate the existing economic repercussions of conflict and displacement. Based on an analysis 
of conflict in Syria, there is evidence that the same types of humanitarian aided conflict seen in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina prevail. The fact that political and dangerous groups, like ISIS, have 
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inadvertently become aid beneficiaries in Syria is alarming.  As in the case of genocide in Rwanda, 
trying to uphold the humanitarian principle of neutrality is an ethical dilemma that aid workers in 
Syria currently face. However, cooperating by having paid rebel forces on humanitarian bases is a 
blatant breach of neutrality and safety for workers and civilians alike. The mere proximity and 
involvement of ISIS members with humanitarians in Syria indicates that this group has more 
leverage and access to resources than could ever be considered neutral, especially when they have 
already demonstrated to the world that they will use these resources to brutally target civilians.  
More pressure must be put on Assad by the UN and others in order to relax travel routes 
needed for aid access, as well as on the Security Council member states to enact their R2P, even 
if not through intervention. Given the complex actors at play in Syria and the overwhelming 
number of Syrian IDPs and refugees that increase daily, this study offers insight into the economic 
downturns that Syria is facing due to conflict and displacement. The lack of resources in the 
disparity between these actors begs attention for the international community to allocate aid in a 
responsible way as to avoid funding violence and the war economy, but to also be wary of long-
term dependence in camps, as demonstrated by lessons from IDP camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Rwanda. Based on these cases, governance within Syrian camps must be carefully facilitated 
in order to avoid reproducing conflict and certain types of black market activity that may further 
fuel conflict or inequality, making already vulnerable populations more vulnerable to armed 
combatants. There is clearly no such thing as a “safe zone” within armed conflict and crisis. 
Protection, neutral or not, must be integral to saving civilian lives. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Aid Indicators and Outcomes by UNHCR 
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Figure 2: Network and Forms of Aid in Syria 
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Figure 3: Territorial Distribution of Powers in Syria 
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